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Tuesday, July 1, 2014

EU Law: Exam Summary Notes on 'The Free Movement of Workers'

THE FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS

1. THE MEANING OF ‘WORKER’

·      There is no definition of ‘worker’ in EU legislation.
·      In Lawrie-Blum, the ECJ defined ‘worker’ with reference to three criteria:
o   provision of services
o   under the direction and control of another person
o   in return for monetary reward / remuneration
·      Part-time and/or low-paid workers are included, regardless of the level of remuneration (Levin; Kempf; Raulin; Ninni-Orasche; Trojani, L.N.). The minimum threshold is that the worker is providing “effective and genuine” activities (Levin). Having to claim income support does not deprive a person of ‘worker’ status (Kempf).
·      Trainees are workers (Lawrie-Blum; Kranemann).
·      Ex-workers can still claim to be ‘workers’ in certain situations. Directive 2004/38, Article 7(3) also protects ex-workers in certain situations:
o   Where they are temporarily unable to work as the result of an illness or accident. This does not include those who are permanently incapacitated from work (De Brito (Court of Appeal); Samin (Court of Appeal)). The question whether this provision covers pregnant women is pending before the ECJ (St Prix).
o   Where they are in involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year or after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a year. This does not apply to those who have become involuntarily un-self-employed (Tilianu (Court of Appeal)).
o   Where they embark on vocational training, although the training must be ‘related’ to the previous employment, unless the worker became involuntarily unemployed. This enacts ECJ case law (Lair; Ninni-Orasche).
·      Genuine work-seekers are protected, provided they can produce evidence to that effect. They can remain in the “host” Member State indefinitely (Antonissen; Collins) and can claim financial benefits “intended to facilitate access to the labour market” (Vatsouras & Koupatantze).
·      Frontier workers are included. These are people who live in one Member State and commute to work in another (Hartmann; Geven; Hendrix).
·      There are some limits: people engaged in rehabilitation courses (e.g. for recovering drug addicts) are not ‘workers’ (Bettray).


2. WORKERS’ RIGHTS

1.      Under Article 45 TFEU

Free movement
·      Workers have the right to move from one Member State to another for the purposes of employment (Article 45(1) TFEU, Bosman).
·      Provisions of national legislation which “preclude or deter” a worker from exercising his/her right to seek employment in another Member State breach Article 45(1), even if the legislation applies “without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned” (Olympique Lyonnais).



Non-discrimination
·      Article 45(2) TFEU prohibits discrimination – whether direct or indirect – against workers based on nationality. This provision may be used to challenge discriminatory national legislation and/or discriminatory employment policies.
·      Article 45(2) is horizontally effective and can be enforced against private employers (Angonese; Casteels v British Airways).
·      Direct discrimination is very difficult to justify. Essentially, only the justifications provided in Article 45(3) TFEU – on grounds of public policy, security and health – and Article 45(4) TFEU – the public service derogation – are available.
·      Indirect discrimination is justifiable on similar grounds to those recognised in the case law involving Article 18 TFEU, i.e. by reference to “objective considerations of public interest”, subject to satisfying proportionality. Examples include:
o   Rewarding worker loyalty (Köbler v Austria; Schöning-Kougebetopoulou)
o   Encouraging the recruitment and training of young workers (Olympique Lyonnais)

2.     Under Regulation 492/2011 (previously Regulation 1612/68)

·      Article 3: Member States may not exclude foreign nationals from employment or subject them to conditions not applicable to the State’s own nationals. However, it is permissible, if the ‘nature of the post’ requires it, that workers have certain linguistic knowledge. This applies to teaching (Groener) and banking (Angonese).
·      Article 4: Member States may not discriminate against other EU nationals by imposing “quotas” on the number of foreign workers. Bosman is a well-known example.
·      Article 7(1): Workers may not be discriminated against by reason of nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and work. This applies to “all statutory or contractual provisions determining [a worker’s] position and in particular their financial rights” (Sotgiu).
o   Article 7(1) overlaps with Article 45(2) TFEU and the provisions have been used interchangeably. For example, an employer’s refusal to recognize an employee’s experience obtained in another Member State, for the purposes of calculating seniority, eligibility for promotion, pension entitlements, etc., breaches EU Law. It can be challenged using Article 45(2) TFEU (Köbler v Austria, Casteels v British Airways) or Article 7(1) (Schöning-Kougebetopoulou).
·      Article 7(2): Workers are entitled to the same ‘social and tax advantages’ as those enjoyed by home State nationals. This covers benefits “whether or not… linked to a contract of employment”, which are “generally granted to national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory” (Even). Examples of ‘social advantages’ include:
o   Mutsch – the choice of language in a criminal trial;
o   Reed – a live-in partner;
o   O’Flynn – funeral expenses;
o   Ninni-Orasche – funding for education;
o   Hartmann and Geven – child-rearing allowance;
o   Hendrix – disabled workers’ allowance.
·      Note: The ECJ has extended the application of Article 7(2) to worker’s family members (irrespective of their nationality). Hence family members can also claim ‘advantages’ such as rail travel discounts (Cristini) and funding for education (Bernini, Meeusen) under the same conditions as nationals of the host State. These cases were decided before Directive 2004/38 came into operation and in future such cases are likely to be dealt with under Article 24.




3. The ‘Public Service’ DEROGATION: Article 45(4) TFEU

·      Under Article 45(4) TFEU, Member States may – if they wish – exclude foreign nationals from ‘public service’ employment.
·      Article 45(4) TFEU only allows Member States to restrict access to public service employment; it does not justify discrimination against non-nationals in terms of remuneration or other work conditions within such employment (Sotgiu).
·      ‘Public service’ employment involves “the exercise of powers conferred by public law and responsibility for safeguarding the general interests of the state” and “a special relationship of allegiance to the state” (Commission v Belgium (No.1); Lawrie-Blum).
·      Article 45(4) TFEU does not apply “if rights under powers conferred by public law are exercised only sporadically, even exceptionally, by nationals of other Member States” (Colegio).
·      The following are not employed in the ‘public service’:
o   doctors (Schöning-Kougebetopoulou);
o   nurses (Commission v France (Nurses));
o   teachers (Lawrie-Blum; Bleis);
o   university lecturers (Alluè & Coonan);
o   carpenters, electricians, gardeners, railways drivers (Commission v Belgium (No.1));
o   utilities company workers (Commission v Belgium (No.2));
o   post and telecom workers, radio and TV broadcasters (Commission v Greece);
o   private security firm employees (Commission v Spain).
·      Article 45(4) TFEU applies to architects and nightwatchmen, if responsible for government buildings and military establishments (Commission v Belgium (No.1), ships’ captains (Colegio), the Armed Force (Alevizos).
·      Other occupations where Article 45(4) probably applies include national security services (e.g. MI5 and MI6 in the UK), the higher levels of the civil service, and the police force.


4. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO EDUCATION: REGULATION 492/2011

·      Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011: worker’s children have the right to be ‘admitted’ to ‘general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses’ under the same conditions as nationals of the host State.
·      Article 10 has been interpreted very widely.
o   The right to be ‘admitted’ to education includes “general measures to facilitate attendance”, i.e. funding for education (Casagrande);
o   ‘Vocational training’ includes University courses (Echternach & Moritz);
o   ‘Children’ encompasses all offspring of workers, irrespective of age (Gaal).
o   Combing the above principles means that the grown-up ‘children’ of workers can use Article 10 to claim maintenance grants for University courses (Di Leo; Gaal).
o   Article 10 refers to a worker’s ‘child’ – this includes step-children (Baumbast; Alarape & Tijani).
·      The working parent must be an EU Citizen but the ‘child’ may be a non-EU national (Baumbast – Colombian; Alarape & Tijani – Nigerian).
·      Article 10 refers to the children of a worker who is or ‘has been employed’ in the host State.
o   The death of the worker is therefore irrelevant (Michel S; Casagrande; Gaal).
o   Similarly if the worker moves to another Member State, or leaves the EU altogether (Baumbast; Ibrahim).
o   In either situation, the child retains his/her right to be educated in the host State.




The “primary carer” doctrine
·         Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 includes a right for the child’s “primary carer” to reside with the child, irrespective of the carer’s nationality (Baumbast & R).
·         The primary carer’s right of residence is based solely on Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011. The residency conditions in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 do not apply (Ibrahim).
o   A “primary carer” can therefore reside in the Member State even if he or she is not:
§  an EU Citizen;
§  working, self-employed or performing any economic activity at all.
·         The ‘child’ must have entered the education system of the host State (Hadj Ahmed).
·         Because Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 expressly refers to the children of ‘employed’ persons (i.e. workers), the “primary carer” doctrine does not cover the children of self-employed people (Czop & Punakova).

·         In principle, the primary carer’s right of residence ends when the child reaches the age of majority (Teixeira). However, the right of residence may extend beyond that age “if the child continues to need the presence and the care of that parent in order to be able to pursue and complete his or her education” (Teixeira). Ultimately this is a question of fact for the national court (Alarape & Tijani).

EU Law: Exam Summary Note on 'Direct & Indirect Effect'

DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECT

1. DIRECT EFFECT OF TREATY ARTICLES and PROVISIONS IN REGULATIONS

·      Direct Effect refers to those provisions of EU legislation which are capable of enforcement before national courts. The principle of direct effect was established in Van Gend en Loos.
·      Many provisions of the TFEU, plus provisions of both regulations and directives, are all capable of direct effect. For a particular provision of EU legislation to be directly effective, certain criteria must be met:

*      sufficiently clear and precise;
*      unconditional.

·      It is not possible to say that an entire regulation, directive, etc., is directly effective. Each individual provision must be tested separately to see if it satisfies the criteria.

TREATY ARTICLES
·      Many articles of the TFEU may have direct effect:
o   Article 21 – Baumbast
o   Article 30 – Van Gend en Loos
o   Article 34 – Ianelli & Volpi v Meroni
o   Article 35 – Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond
o   Article 45(1) – Van Duyn
o   Article 45(2) – Angonese
o   Article 49 – Reyners
o   Article 56 – Van Binsbergen
o   Article 101  – Courage Ltd v Crehan
o   Article 157  – Defrenne v SABENA

·      Where a Treaty article is directly effective then it is usually both vertically (enforceable against the State) and horizontally effective (enforceable against individuals). Cases of horizontal direct effect include Angonese and Casteels v British Airways (Article 45(2)), Viking Line (Article 49), Courage Ltd v Crehan (Article 101), Defrenne v SABENA (Article 157).

PROVISIONS in REGULATIONS
·      If a provision in a regulation is found to be sufficiently precise and unconditional, it will be directly effective vertically and horizontally (Muñoz & Superior Fruiticola v Frumar Ltd & Redbridge Ltd).


2. DIRECT EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES

·      Directives are designed to be ‘implemented’ or ‘transposed’ into national legislation. However, if a directive is still unimplemented after the implementation deadline has expired, then the possibility of direct effect arises. Thus was first decided in Van Duyn v Home Office.

1. Limitation on the Direct Effect of Directives I: Significance of the Time Limit for Implementation
·      Generally speaking, directives may only become directly effective once their implementation deadline has expired (Ratti). Until then, provisions within a directive may not be relied on.
·      However, an exception to this rule was introduced in Mangold v Helm, where a directive was held to be enforceable in advance of its implementation deadline – because the directive gave effect to the “general principle of equal treatment, in particular in respect of age”.

2. Limitation on the Direct Effect of Directives II: Directives are only enforceable against the “State”
·         The litigation in Van Duyn and Ratti was between individuals and the State. This is known as the “vertical direct effect of directives”. The justification for this is based on the fact that directives are specifically addressed to the Member States, who should not be allowed to avoid their obligations under a directive by failing to implement it (Van Duyn).
·         The “State” clearly includes central government (Van Duyn; Ratti; Becker).
·         It also includes local government (Constanzo; Jiménez Melgar) and public health authorities (Marshall).
·         In Johnston it was decided that directives could also be enforced against an “emanation” of the State, such as the police force. In Foster v British Gas, paragraph 18, the ECJ decided that directives were enforceable against any body:

Ø under the control of the State OR
Ø which has special powers

·      However, the Court then stated that directives were enforceable against bodies which were under State control AND had special powers (paragraph 20). In subsequent cases, English courts (see e.g. Doughty v Rolls Royce) and the ECJ itself (see e.g. Dominguez) have adopted paragraph 20 as the test.
·      If a case involves “vertical direct effect” then it does not matter in what capacity the State is operating (Farrell). Several cases involve the State acting in its capacity as an employer (Marshall; Johnston; Foster; Jiménez Melgar; Dominguez).
·      However, unimplemented directives may not be enforced against other individuals (Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority).  There is therefore “no horizontal direct effect of directives”. There are two main reasons:

*      There is no fault on the part of an individual that the directive has not been implemented;
*      Until directives have been implemented into national law, individuals have a right to rely upon existing national legislation.         

·         The ECJ has continually refused to allow directives to be given direct effect in cases between individuals. This has been confirmed many times since (Faccini Dori v Recreb, El Corte Inglés v Blázquez Rivero). To the same effect see Doughty v Rolls Royce (Court of Appeal) and Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No.2) (House of Lords).
·      The refusal by the ECJ to allow directives to be enforced in the context of “horizontal” litigation does mean that it is arbitrary whether individuals will be able to rely on provisions in directives. For example, Nurse A employed by an NHS Trust (part of the “State”) will be able to rely on any directly effective provisions of a directive while Nurse B employed by BUPA (a private employer) will not.

·      There is no “reverse” vertical direct effect – the State may not enforce an unimplemented directive against an individual (Kolpinghuis).



Incidental Direct Effect
·      The ECJ has sometimes allowed something very similar to the horizontal direct effect of directives. The Court has allowed individuals to use a directive, defensively, to prevent other individuals from enforcing national legislation that is inconsistent with that directive (CIA Security v Signalson & Securitel, Abrahamsson & Anderson v Fogelqvist, Mangold v Helm, Kücükdeveci v Swedex, Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España).
·      In Roca Álvarez, A-G Kokott referred to some of these cases as involving “horizontal direct effect”. However, the ECJ has not gone this far. For the time being, therefore, the principle in Marshall – that directives cannot be used, offensively, against individuals – remains good law.

Triangular Direct Effect
·      In Wells, the ECJ decided that an individual could enforce the provisions in a directive against the State even if this had the side-effect of imposing obligations on another individual.


3. inDIRECT EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES

·      Indirect effect requires national courts to interpret ambiguous national legislation “in the light of” any relevant EU directive, that is, by interpreting the national law in such a way as to promote the purpose(s) of the directive.
·      Indirect effect was introduced by the ECJ in 1984, in Von Colson.
·      Originally, indirect effect only covered the interpretation of national legislation passed specifically in order to implement a directive. An example is Pfeiffer, involving the interpretation of the German legislation adopted in order to implement Directive 93/104.
·      However, indirect effect was extended in Marleasing to the interpretation of all national legislation, even where it predated the relevant directive.
·      Indirect effect is also available in “horizontal” disputes. Examples include:
o    Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd., in which the House of Lords interpreted UK legislation in the light of Directive 77/187. Litster illustrates the Von Colson situation, as the UK legislation was designed to implement the directive.
o   Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No.2), in which the House of Lords interpreted the UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in the light of Directive 76/207. Webb illustrates the Marleasing situation as the 1975 Act predated the directive.

Limits on Indirect Effect
·      Indirect effect cannot be used if the effect of doing so would be to determine, or aggravate, the criminal liability of persons who act in contravention of the directive (Kolpinghuis; Arcaro).
·      Indirect effect imposes an obligation on national courts to implement domestic legislation only “so far as possible” (Marleasing). It does not, therefore, apply to national law which is utterly unambiguous and incapable of being “interpreted” by national courts (QDQ Media v Omedas Lecha). Similarly, A-G Sharpston said that indirect effect does not require national courts to impose an “artificial” or “strained” interpretation of national law (UNIBET).
·      The obligation to interpret national legislation only applies from the date of implementation of the directive (Adeneler).