STATE LIABILITY
1. INTRODUCTION and CONDITIONS FOR STATE LIABILITY
Introduction
·
In Francovich
v Italy, the ECJ created the possibility of seeking an award of
compensation against a State whose failure to implement a directive caused an
individual to suffer loss.
·
State liability (SL) involves an action in the
courts of the relevant State.
·
SL is not limited to the failure by the State to
implement a directive, as in Francovich,
although that still remains a good example (Dillenkofer
v Germany, BT, Rechberger v Austria, Stockholm Lindöpark v
Sweden). SL also extends to breaches of EU law by Member States generally:
Ø Article 34 TFEU: the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions on imports (Brasserie
du Pêcheur v Germany, Schmidberger v Austria, Danske Slagterier v Germany).
Ø Article35 TFEU: the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions on exports (Hedley
Lomas).
Ø Article 45(2) TFEU: the free movement
of workers – specifically the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality (Köbler v Austria).
Ø Article 49 TFEU: the freedom of establishment (Factortame III, Haim).
Conditions for State Liability
· In Brasserie du Pêcheur / Factortame III, the ECJ identified three
conditions for State liability:
the rule of law infringed must be intended to
confer rights on individuals;
the breach of EU law must be “sufficiently
serious”;
a direct causal link between the State’s failure to
comply with EU law and the damage suffered by the individual.
- Intention to Confer Rights on Individuals
· This criterion was satisfied in Brasserie
du Pêcheur (Article 34 TFEU), Hedley
Lomas (Article 35 TFEU), Köbler (Article
45(2) TFEU) and Factortame III
(Article 49 TEU). All of these Treaty provisions are also directly effective.
· In Dillenkofer and Rechberger the ECJ
held that Art.7 of Directive 90/134 (the
Package Travel Directive) conferred individual rights, and in Fuß v City of Halle, the ECJ held that Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 (the Working Time Directive) did so too. However, in Paul
& Others v Germany, the
ECJ decided that Art.3(1) of Directive 94/19 did not do so.
- A Sufficiently Serious Breach
· The decisive test is whether there had been a “manifest and grave”
disregard of the limits of the State’s discretion.
· The ECJ has identified several “factors” in seeking to prove this:
1.
the clarity and precision of the rule breached,
2. the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national...
authorities,
3. whether the infringement was
intentional or involuntary,
4. whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable,
5. the fact that the position taken by an institution of the EU (such as
the European Commission) may have contributed,
6. the adoption or retention of national measures contrary to EU law.
Failure to implement a Directive on time
· Such a breach is automatically sufficiently serious (Dillenkofer).
Defiance of clear ECJ caselaw
· Such a breach is also automatically sufficiently serious (Fuß).
Who applies the “Sufficiently
Serious” Test?
· This, generally speaking, is a task for the national courts.
· Sometimes, however, the ECJ will rule that the breach has been so
obviously serious (or not) that it will answer this question itself (Hedley Lomas, BT, Rechberger, Stockholm
Lindöpark).
- A Direct Causal Link between Breach and Damage
It is for the national courts to determine whether the causal link
exists (Brasserie du Pêcheur / Factortame III; Leth v Austria). This is
done by applying national rules on causation.
2. whAt is the state?
· The principle of State Liability applies regardless of the organ of the
State whose acts or omissions are responsible for the breach.
· Most of the cases have involved central government (Francovich, Brasserie du Pêcheur, Factortame III, Dillenkofer, BT, Hedley Lomas, Rechberger,
Stockholm Lindöpark, etc).
· However, there is no requirement that a claimant in a SL case must
bring their action against central government. In federal States, including
Austria and Germany, it would be possible to bring an SL case against a
regional government instead (Konle, Fuß v
City of Halle).
· In Haim, the ECJ held that any
public body could face SL actions.
· The judiciary may also be
held liable (Köbler v Austria, Traghetti del Mediterraneo v Italy). Only national courts adjudicating
at last instance may face SL actions. Generally speaking, this means national Supreme
Courts, although in Cooper v Attorney
General (2010) an action was brought against the Court of Appeal because it
had been the “court of last resort”. The Köbler
/ Traghetti decisions raise certain
problems of principle (e.g., does it affect judicial independence?) and
practical difficulties about how this policy is to be put into practice.
· In AGM v Finland the ECJ
decided that an individual could be held liable under SL in addition to the
State itself, a form of vicarious liability.
3. LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
OF DAMAGES
Reparation is subject to two conditions (Brasserie du Pêcheur, Factortame III):
· The principle of equivalence. Reparation must be made in accordance with national rules on
liability, but under conditions that are no less favourable than for similar
domestic claims. Thus, for example,
exemplary damages are available in SL claims against the UK because exemplary
damages may be awarded in cases against British public authorities in domestic
litigation. Similarly, Member States may impose limitation periods on the
recovery of SL claims, as they do with domestic claims, provided that the
periods are reasonable (Danske Slagterier).
A 3-year period will not be unreasonable.
· The principle of effectiveness. This means that national rules on recovery of compensation in SL
claims cannot be so framed so as to make it in practice “impossible or
excessively difficult” to obtain compensation. Thus, total exclusion of loss of
profit in the context of economic and commercial litigation is not
acceptable as far as SL claims are concerned.
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